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Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions 
Abstract 
Legislation to reauthorize Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”), sometimes called “fast track,” was 
introduced as the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA- 2015; 
H.R. 1890/S. 995) on April 16, 2015. The legislation was reported by the Senate Finance Committee on 
April 22, 2015, and by the House Ways and Means Committee the next day. TPA, as incorporated into H.R. 
1314 by substitute amendment, passed the Senate on May 22 by a vote of 62-37. In the House of 
Representatives, the measure was voted on under a procedure known as “division of the question,” which 
requires separate votes on each component, but approval of both to pass. Voting on June 12, TPA (Title I) 
passed by a vote of 219-211, but TAA (Title II) was defeated 126-302. A motion to reconsider that vote 
was laid by Speaker Boehner shortly after that vote. The previous grant of authority expired on July 1, 
2007. 
TPA requires that if the President negotiates an international trade agreement that would reduce tariff or 
non-tariff barriers to trade in ways that require changes in U.S. law, the United States can implement the 
agreement only through the enactment of legislation. If the trade agreement and the process of 
negotiating it meet certain requirements, TPA allows Congress to consider the required implementing bill 
under expedited (“fast track”) procedures, pursuant to which the bill may come to the floor without action 
by the leadership, and can receive a guaranteed up-or-down vote with no amendments. 
Under TPA, an implementing bill may be eligible for this expedited consideration if (1) the trade 
agreement was negotiated during the limited time period for which TPA is in effect; (2) the agreement 
advances a series of U.S. trade negotiating objectives specified in the TPA statute; (3) the negotiations 
were conducted in conjunction with an extensive array of required notifications to and consultations with 
Congress and other stakeholders; and (4) the President submits to Congress a draft implementing bill, 
which must meet specific content requirements, and a range of required supporting information. If, in any 
given case, Congress judges that these requirements have not been met, TPA provides mechanisms 
through which the eligibility of the implementing bill for expedited consideration may be withdrawn in one 
or both chambers. 
The most recent previous renewal of TPA covered agreements reached between December 2002 and the 
end of June 2007. Current legislation would apply to agreements reached before July 1, 2018, with a 
possible extension to July 1, 2021. The United States is now engaged in several sets of trade agreement 
negotiations. Legislation to reauthorize TPA was introduced, but not considered, in the 113th Congress. 
The issue of TPA reauthorization raises a number of questions regarding TPA itself and the pending 
legislation. This report addresses a number of those questions that are frequently asked, including the 
following: 
• What is trade promotion authority? 
• Is TPA necessary? 
• What are trade negotiating objectives and how are they reflected in TPA statutes? 
• What requirements does Congress impose on the President under TPA? 
• Does TPA affect congressional authority on trade policy? 
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Summary 
Legislation to reauthorize Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”), sometimes called “fast track,” was 
introduced as the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA-
2015; H.R. 1890/S. 995) on April 16, 2015. The legislation was reported by the Senate Finance 
Committee on April 22, 2015, and by the House Ways and Means Committee the next day. TPA, 
as incorporated into H.R. 1314 by substitute amendment, passed the Senate on May 22 by a vote 
of 62-37. In the House of Representatives, the measure was voted on under a procedure known as 
“division of the question,” which requires separate votes on each component, but approval of both 
to pass. Voting on June 12, TPA (Title I) passed by a vote of 219-211, but TAA (Title II) was 
defeated 126-302. A motion to reconsider that vote was laid by Speaker Boehner shortly after that 
vote. The previous grant of authority expired on July 1, 2007. 
TPA requires that if the President negotiates an international trade agreement that would reduce 
tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade in ways that require changes in U.S. law, the United States can 
implement the agreement only through the enactment of legislation. If the trade agreement and 
the process of negotiating it meet certain requirements, TPA allows Congress to consider the 
required implementing bill under expedited (“fast track”) procedures, pursuant to which the bill 
may come to the floor without action by the leadership, and can receive a guaranteed up-or-down 
vote with no amendments.  
Under TPA, an implementing bill may be eligible for this expedited consideration if (1) the trade 
agreement was negotiated during the limited time period for which TPA is in effect; (2) the 
agreement advances a series of U.S. trade negotiating objectives specified in the TPA statute; (3) 
the negotiations were conducted in conjunction with an extensive array of required notifications 
to and consultations with Congress and other stakeholders; and (4) the President submits to 
Congress a draft implementing bill, which must meet specific content requirements, and a range 
of required supporting information. If, in any given case, Congress judges that these requirements 
have not been met, TPA provides mechanisms through which the eligibility of the implementing 
bill for expedited consideration may be withdrawn in one or both chambers.  
The most recent previous renewal of TPA covered agreements reached between December 2002 
and the end of June 2007. Current legislation would apply to agreements reached before July 1, 
2018, with a possible extension to July 1, 2021. The United States is now engaged in several sets 
of trade agreement negotiations. Legislation to reauthorize TPA was introduced, but not 
considered, in the 113th Congress.  
The issue of TPA reauthorization raises a number of questions regarding TPA itself and the 
pending legislation. This report addresses a number of those questions that are frequently asked, 
including the following:  
• What is trade promotion authority? 
• Is TPA necessary? 
• What are trade negotiating objectives and how are they reflected in TPA statutes? 
• What requirements does Congress impose on the President under TPA? 
• Does TPA affect congressional authority on trade policy? 
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This report describes aspects of the proposed TPA-2015 introduced on April 16, 2015. For more 
information on TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of 
Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian F. Fergusson, and CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson.  
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Background on Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
What is Trade Promotion Authority? 
Trade promotion authority (“TPA”), sometimes called “fast track,” refers to the process Congress 
has made available to the President for limited periods to enable legislation to approve and 
implement certain international trade agreements to be considered under expedited legislative 
procedures. If a trade agreement negotiated by the President would reduce barriers to trade in 
ways that require changes in U.S. law, Congress would be responsible for implementing the 
agreement through legislation. If the content of the implementing bill and the process of 
negotiating it meet certain requirements, however, TPA provides that it may come to the floor 
without leadership action and can receive a guaranteed up-or-down vote with no amendments.  
In order to be eligible for this expedited consideration, a trade agreement must be negotiated 
during the limited time period for which TPA is in effect, and must advance a series of U.S. trade 
negotiating objectives specified in the TPA statute. In addition, the negotiations must be 
conducted in conjunction with an extensive array of required notifications to and consultations 
with Congress and other public and private sector stakeholders. Finally, the President must submit 
to Congress a draft implementing bill, which must meet specific content requirements, and a 
range of supporting information. If, in any given case, Congress judges that these requirements 
have not been met, TPA provides mechanisms through which the implementing bill may be made 
ineligible for expedited consideration. 
More generally, TPA defines how Congress has chosen to exercise its constitutional authority 
over a particular aspect of trade policy, while affording the President added leverage to negotiate 
trade agreements by giving trading partners assurance that final agreements can receive 
consideration by Congress in a timely manner and without amendments.1 
Has legislation to renew TPA been introduced in the 
114th Congress? 
Yes, the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2015 (TPA-2015) (H.R. 1890; S. 995) 
was introduced on April 16, 2015. Like previous TPA authorizations, the TPA-2015 would grant 
the authority for a limited time, and would permit a single extension if the President requests it 
and Congress does not disapprove.2 The proposed TPA-2015 would apply to trade agreements 
entered into (signed) before July 1, 2018, or before July 1, 2021, if the President requests the 
extension, subject to a congressional resolution of disapproval.3 Similar, though not identical, 
bills were reported by the Senate Finance Committee on April 22, 2015, and by the House Ways 
and Means Committee the next day. The legislation, as reported by the Senate Finance 
Committee, was joined with legislation extending Trade Adjustment Assistance into a substitute 
                                                 
1 For more detailed background and analysis of TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and 
the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian F. Fergusson, and CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority 
(TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson. 
2 The last previous authorization, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, also granted the authority for 
three years with an option for a two-year extension.  
3 See “What is the effect of an ‘extension disapproval resolution’?” later.  
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amendment to H.R. 1314 (an unrelated revenue measure), and that legislation was passed by the 
Senate on May 22 by a vote of 62-37. In the House of Representatives, the measure was voted on 
under a procedure known as “division of the question,” which requires separate votes on each 
component, but approval of both to pass. Voting on June 12, TPA (Title I) passed by a vote of 
219-211, but TAA (Title II) was defeated 126-302. A motion to reconsider that vote was laid by 
Speaker Boehner shortly after that vote. The previous grant of authority expired on July 1, 2007. 
What is Congress’s responsibility for trade under the Constitution?  
The U.S. Constitution assigns express authority over the regulation of foreign trade to Congress. 
Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations…” 
and to “…lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises….” In contrast, the Constitution 
assigns no specific responsibility for trade to the President. Under Article II, however, the 
President has exclusive authority to negotiate treaties and international agreements and exercises 
broad authority over the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs.  
What authority does Congress grant to the President by enacting 
TPA legislation? 
In a sense, TPA grants no new authority to the President. The President possesses inherent 
authority to negotiate with other countries to arrive at trade agreements. If any such agreement 
requires changes in U.S. law, however, it could be implemented only through legislation enacted 
by Congress. (In some cases, as well, Congress has enacted legislation authorizing the President 
in advance to implement certain kinds of agreements on his own authority. An example is the 
historical reciprocal tariff agreement authority described under the next question.) TPA legislation 
provides expedited legislative procedures (also known as “fast track” procedures) to facilitate 
congressional action on legislation to implement trade agreements of the kinds specified in the 
TPA statute. TPA legislation also establishes trade negotiating objectives and notification and 
consultation requirements described later.  
Is TPA necessary? 
The President has the authority to negotiate international agreements, including free trade 
agreements (FTAs), but the Constitution gives the Congress sole authority over the regulation of 
foreign commerce. For 150 years, Congress exercised this authority over foreign trade by setting 
tariff rates directly. This policy changed with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, in 
which Congress delegated temporary authority to the President to enter into (sign) reciprocal 
trade agreements that reduced tariffs within pre-approved levels and implement them by 
proclamation without further congressional action. This authority was renewed a number of times 
until 1974. 
In the 1960s, as international trade expanded, nontariff barriers, such as antidumping measures, 
safety and certification requirements, and government procurement practices, became subjects of 
trade negotiations and agreements. Congress altered the authority delegated to the President to 
require enactment of an implementing bill to authorize changes in U.S. law required to meet 
obligations of these new kinds. For trade agreements that contained such provisions, pre-approval 
was no longer an option. Because an implementing bill faced potential amendment by Members 
of Congress that could alter a long-negotiated agreement, Congress adopted fast track authority in 
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the Trade Act of 1974 to ensure that the implementing bill could receive floor consideration and 
to provide a procedure under which it could not be amended. The act also established U.S. trade 
negotiating objectives and attempted to ensure executive branch notification of and consultation 
with Congress and the private sector. Fast track was renamed Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in 
the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. 
Many observers point out that U.S. trade partners might be reluctant to negotiate with the United 
States, especially on politically sensitive issues, unless they are confident that the U.S. executive 
branch and Congress speak with one voice, that a trade agreement negotiated by the executive 
branch would receive timely legislative consideration, that it would not unravel by congressional 
amendments, and that the United States would implement the terms of the agreement reached. 
Others, however, have argued that because trade negotiations and agreements have become more 
complex and more comprehensive, bills to implement the agreements should be subject to 
amendment like other legislation. In practice, even though TPA is designed to ensure that 
Congress will act on implementing bills without amending them, it also affords Congress several 
procedural means to maintain its constitutional authority.4  
What requirements have been placed on the President under TPA? 
In general, under TPA, Congress has required the President to notify Congress and consult with 
Congress and with private sector stakeholders before, during, and upon completion of trade 
agreement negotiations. Congress also has required the President to strive to adhere to general 
and specific principal trade negotiating objectives in any trade agreement negotiated under TPA. 
After signing the agreement, the President submits a draft implementing bill to Congress, along 
with the text of the trade agreement and a statement of administrative action required to 
implement it. (See sections below.) 
Is there a deadline for the President to submit a draft implementing 
bill to Congress? 
No. If the United States enters into (signs) a trade agreement within a period for which TPA is 
provided, the President may submit the implementing bill to Congress at his discretion. 
When was TPA/fast track first used? 
Trade promotion authority was first enacted on January 1, 1975, under the Trade Act of 1974. It 
was used to enact the Tokyo Round Agreements Act of 1979, which implemented the 1974-1979 
multilateral trade liberalization agreements reached under the Tokyo Round negotiations under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Since that time it was renewed three time times—1979, 1988, and 2002. In 
1993, Congress provided a short-term extension to accommodate the completion of the GATT 
Uruguay Round negotiations. 
                                                 
4 See “Expedited Procedures and the Congressional Role,” below. 
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How many times has TPA/fast track been used? 
Since 1979, the authority has been used for 14 bilateral/regional free trade agreements (FTAs) and 
one additional set of multilateral trade liberalization agreements under the GATT (now the World 
Trade Organization [WTO])—the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994.5 One FTA—the U.S.-
Jordan FTA—was negotiated and approved by Congress without TPA. That FTA was largely 
considered non-controversial and applies to only a small portion of U.S. total trade.  
How has the lack of TPA affected current trade agreement 
negotiations? 
The current effort to reauthorize TPA has been motivated, in part, by the engagement of the 
United States in three sets of trade negotiations: the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
agreement with 11 other countries; the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(T-TIP) agreement with the 28-member European Union (EU); and the proposed Trade in 
Services Agreement (TISA) with 22 other trading partners, including the EU. Future agreements 
may be reached under the WTO, including a tariff liberalization agreement on environmental 
goods. The Obama Administration has fulfilled the notification and consultation requirements 
under the most recent TPA for each of these sets of negotiations in anticipation that it would be 
renewed. Some trade partners have suggested that the lack of TPA has slowed progress in the 
negotiations on the TPP, and without the assurance of TPA, they are reluctant to agree to 
commitments on more sensitive issues.  
Do other countries have a TPA-type legislative mechanism? 
In some countries, the executive may possess authority to conclude trade agreements without 
legislative approval. In others, especially in parliamentary systems, the head of government is 
typically able to secure approval of any requisite legislation without amendment under regular 
legislative procedures. In addition, some countries prohibit amendments to trade agreement 
legislation and others treat trade agreements as treaties that are self-executing. 
Will TPA legislation be considered like other bills or be subject to 
expedited procedures? 
Legislation to reauthorize TPA is considered under standard legislative procedures. Therefore, 
regular rules on debate, amendments, and votes would apply. 
What is the “Right Track for TPP Act of 2015” (Levin Substitute)? 
During the House Ways and Means Committee markup of H.R. 1890 on April 23, 2015, Ranking 
Member Sander Levin sought to offer “The Right Track for TPP Act of 2015” as a substitute 
amendment to the legislation. While Chairman Paul Ryan ruled the measure out of order, this 
                                                 
5 In the House, many of these agreements were actually considered not under TPA procedures themselves, but under 
special rules from the Committee on Rules. See “May Congress override the expedited procedures?” below. 
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substitute amendment may form the basis for an alternative proposal for floor consideration. 
Among other provisions, the proposal would provide expedited procedures only for the TPP, and 
only if certain negotiating “instructions,” consultations, transparency, and procedures are met.6 
What Transpired During Senate Floor Consideration? 
The Senate considered an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1314, an unrelated 
revenue measure, which combined Trade Promotion Authority (S. 995) and Trade Adjustment 
Assistance Reauthorization (S. 1268) legislation. Members submitted 213 amendments to the 
substitute amendment: 11 were proposed on the floor, 8 were voted on, 3 were agreed upon, and 3 
were considered non-germane. The three amendments passed were the Hatch/Wyden amendment 
on currency and the Lankford amendment proposing an overall negotiating objective on religious 
freedom (both described in questions related to negotiating objectives, below), as well as the 
underlying substitute amendment. The Senate passed H.R. 1314 incorporating the substitute 
amendment on May 22, 2015, by a vote of 62-37. 
Trade Negotiating Objectives 
What are U.S. trade negotiating objectives? 
Congress exercises its trade policy role, in part, by defining trade negotiating objectives in TPA 
legislation. The negotiating objectives are definitive statements of U.S. trade policy that Congress 
expects the Administration to honor, if the implementing legislation is to be considered under 
expedited rules. Since the original fast track authorization in the Trade Act of 1974, Congress has 
revised and expanded the negotiating objectives in succeeding TPA/fast track authorization 
statutes to reflect changing priorities and the evolving international trade environment. Since the 
last grant of TPA in 2002, new issues associated with state-owned enterprises, digital trade in 
goods and services, and localization policies have come to the forefront of U.S. trade policy and 
are included in the proposed TPA-2015 as principal negotiating objectives. 
Under the TPA-2002, the most recent previous authorization, Congress established trade 
negotiating objectives in three categories: (1) overall objectives; (2) principal objectives; and (3) 
other priorities. These begin with broad goals that encapsulate the “overall” direction trade 
negotiations are expected to take, such as fostering U.S. and global economic growth and 
obtaining more favorable market access for U.S. products and services. Principal objectives are 
more specific and are considered the most politically critical set of objectives. The proposed TPA-
2015 uses a similar structure.  
                                                 
6 For the Levin substitute amendment, see http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/
democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/Right%20Track%20for%20TPP%20Bill.pdf.  
For a summary, see http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/
Right%20Track%20for%20TPP%20Act%20Summary_0.pdf. 
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Goods, Services, and Agriculture 
What are some of the negotiating objectives for market access for goods? 
The market access negotiating objectives under TPA seek to reduce or to eliminate tariff and non-
tariff barriers and practices that decrease market access for U.S. products. One new provision in 
the proposed TPA-2015 considers the “utilization of global chains” in the goal of trade 
liberalization. It also calls for the use of sectoral tariff and non-tariff barrier elimination 
agreements to achieve greater market access. Agriculture (see below) and textiles and apparel are 
addressed by separate negotiating objectives. For textiles and apparel, U.S. negotiators are to seek 
competitive export opportunities “substantially equivalent to the opportunities afforded foreign 
exports in the United States markets and to achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade” in 
the sector. Both the general market access provisions and the textile and apparel provisions in the 
proposed TPA-2015 were the same as those in the 2002 Act.  
Have U.S. negotiating objectives evolved on services trade? 
Services have become an increasingly important element of the U.S. economy, and the sector 
plays a prominent role in U.S. trade policy.7 The rising importance of services is reflected in their 
treatment under TPA statutes as a principal negotiating objective beginning with the 1984 Trade 
Act. 
Liberalization of trade in services was expressed in the 2002 Trade Act as a principal negotiating 
objective. It required that U.S. negotiators strive to reduce or eliminate barriers to trade in 
services, including regulations that deny nondiscriminatory treatment to U.S. services and inhibit 
the right of establishment (through foreign investment) to U.S. service providers. The content of 
the negotiating objective on services has not changed appreciably over the years. (Because 
foreign direct investment is an important mode of delivery of services, negotiating objectives on 
foreign investment (see below) pertain to services as well.)  
The proposed TPA-2015 expands the principal negotiating objectives on services in the 2002 TPA 
by highlighting the role of services in global value chains and calling for the pursuit of liberalized 
trade in services through all means, including plurilateral trade agreements (presumably referring 
to the proposed Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)).  
How did the negotiating objectives for agriculture differ from those in the 
2002 TPA? 
The proposed TPA-2015 adds three new agriculture negotiating objectives to the 18 previously 
listed in the 2002 Act. One lays out in greater detail what U.S. negotiators should achieve in 
negotiating robust trade rules on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures (i.e., those dealing 
with a country’s food safety and animal and plant health laws and regulations). This increased 
emphasis aims to address the concerns expressed by U.S. agricultural exporters that other 
countries use SPS measures as disguised non-tariff barriers, which undercut the market access 
                                                 
7 For more information, please see CRS Report R43291, U.S. Foreign Trade in Services: Trends and U.S. Policy 
Challenges, by William H. Cooper and Rebecca M. Nelson. 
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openings that the United States negotiates in trade agreements. The second calls for trade 
negotiators to ensure transparency in how tariff-rate quotas (TRQs)8 are administered that may 
impede market access opportunities. The third seeks to eliminate and prevent the improper use of 
a country’s system to protect or recognize geographical indications (GI). These are trademark-like 
terms used to protect the quality and reputation of distinctive agricultural products, wines, and 
spirits produced in a particular region of a country. This new objective is intended to counter in 
large part the European Union’s efforts to include GI protection in its bilateral trade agreements 
for the names of its products that U.S. and other country exporters argue are generic in nature or 
commonly used across borders, such as parma ham or parmesan cheese. 
Foreign Investment 
What are U.S. negotiating objectives on foreign investment? 
The United States is the largest source and destination of foreign direct investment in the world. 
Both the 2002 Act and the proposed TPA-2015 include identical principal negotiating objectives 
on foreign investment.9 The overall negotiating objectives on foreign investment are designed “to 
reduce or eliminate artificial or trade distorting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that 
foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to 
investment protections than domestic investors in the United States, and to secure for investors 
important rights comparable to those that would be available under the United States legal 
principles and practices.... ” Like the 2002 TPA, the proposed TPA-2015 seeks to accomplish 
these goals by including provisions establishing protections for U.S. foreign investment, such as 
non-discriminatory treatment, free transfer of investment-related capital flows, reducing or 
eliminating local performance requirements, and including established standards for 
compensation for expropriation consistent with U.S. legal principles and practices. These 
provisions are also part of the bilateral investments treaties (BIT) that the United States negotiates 
with other countries. The proposed TPA-2015 also seeks to improve investor-state dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 
To what extent does TPA address investor-state dispute settlement? 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) allows for private foreign investors to seek international 
arbitration against host governments to settle claims over alleged violations of foreign investment 
provisions in FTAs. The 2002 TPA authority and the proposed TPA-2015 do not specifically 
mention an ISDS mechanism. They do state that trade agreements should provide meaningful 
procedures for resolving investment disputes; seek to improve mechanisms used to resolve 
                                                 
8 A TRQ is a trade policy tool used to protect a domestically produced commodity or product from competitive 
imports. It combines two policy instruments that nations historically have used to restrict such imports: quotas and 
tariffs. In a TRQ, the quota component works together with a specified tariff level to provide the desired degree of 
import protection. Imports entering during a specific time period under the quota portion of a TRQ are usually subject 
to a lower, or sometimes a zero, tariff rate. Imports above the quota’s quantitative threshold face a much higher (usually 
prohibitive) tariff. 
9 For more information, please see CRS Report R43052, U.S. International Investment Agreements: Issues for 
Congress, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Martin A. Weiss; CRS Report R44015, International Investment Agreements 
(IIAs): Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by Martin A. Weiss; CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson; and CRS Report R43988, Issues in International Trade: A Legal Overview of 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, by Brandon J. Murrill and Daniel T. Shedd.  
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disputes between an investor and a government through mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims 
and to deter the filing of frivolous claims; provide procedures to ensure the efficient selection of 
arbitrators and the expeditious disposition of claims; provide procedures to enhance opportunities 
for public input into the formulation of government positions; and seek to provide for an appellate 
body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to interpretations of investment provisions in 
trade agreements. 
How have these provisions evolved over time?  
Two negotiating objectives relating to foreign investment were initially listed under the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 fast-track authority. The 2002 TPA and the proposed 
TPA-2015 list eight. In addition to TPA, U.S. investment negotiating objectives are shaped by the 
U.S. Model BIT, the template used to negotiate U.S. BITs and FTA investment chapters. The 
Model BIT has been revised periodically in an effort to balance investor protections and other 
policy interests. The 2004 Model BIT, for instance, narrowed the definitions of covered 
investment and minimum standard of treatment, and connected the definition of direct and 
indirect expropriation to “property rights or property interests,” reflecting the U.S. Constitution’s 
Takings Clause and with possible implications for expropriation protection depending on foreign 
countries’ definitions of property. It also clarified that only in rare cases do non-discriminatory 
regulatory actions by governments to protect legitimate public welfare objectives result in indirect 
expropriation. In response to global economic changes, the 2012 Model BIT, among other things, 
clarified that its obligations apply to state-owned enterprises, as well as to the types of financial 
services that may fall under a prudential exception (such as to address balance of payments 
problems). Other examples of revisions to the Model BIT over time include more detailed 
provisions on ISDS, stronger aspirational language on environmental and labor standards, and 
enhanced transparency obligations.  
Will foreign investors be afforded “greater rights” than U.S. investors under 
U.S. trade agreements? 
The 2002 TPA authority and the proposed TPA-2015 state that no trade agreement is to lead to the 
granting of foreign investors in the United States greater substantive rights than are granted to 
U.S. investors in the United States. Some have argued, however, that the use of ISDS itself 
implies greater procedural rights. 
Trade Remedies 
What are “trade remedies?” 
“Trade remedies” are statutory provisions that provide U.S. firms with the means to redress unfair 
trade practices by foreign actors, whether firms or governments. Examples are antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws.10 The “escape clause” or “safeguard provision” permits temporary 
restraints on import surges not considered to be unfairly traded, and thus may also be considered 
trade remedies. 
                                                 
10 For more information, please see CRS Report RL32371, Trade Remedies: A Primer, by Vivian C. Jones. 
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How does TPA address trade remedies? 
The principal trade negotiating objective concerning trade remedies in TPA has been to “preserve 
the ability of the United States to rigorously enforce its trade laws” and to avoid concluding 
“agreements that weaken the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on unfair 
trade.” Trade remedies have usually been addressed in the context of multilateral WTO 
negotiations. This objective reflects the perception by some Members of Congress that other 
WTO members have sought to weaken U.S. trade remedy laws. The proposed TPA-2015 also 
maintains past notification provisions that require the President to notify Congress 180 days 
before signing (entering into) a trade agreement that included provisions affecting trade remedy 
laws. 
Currency Issues 
Have currency practices ever been addressed in a TPA authorization? 
The extent to which some countries may use the value of their currency to gain competitive 
market advantage is a source of concern for certain industries and some Members of Congress. In 
TPA-2002, the President was to seek to establish consultative mechanisms with trading partners 
to examine the trade consequences of significant and unanticipated currency movements and to 
scrutinize whether a foreign government has manipulated its currency to promote a competitive 
advantage in international trade. This provision was contained in the section on “Promotion of 
Certain Priorities.” 
How are currency issues addressed under current TPA renewal legislation?  
The proposed TPA-2015 elevates the topic of currency manipulation to a principal U.S. 
negotiating objective. The legislation, as introduced, stipulates that U.S. trade agreement partners 
“avoid manipulating exchange rates in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment 
or to gain unfair competitive advantage.” It does not specifically define currency manipulation to 
include or exclude central bank intervention in the domestic economy, hence it does not 
differentiate among the ways a government can affect the value of its currency such as currency 
market intervention, or central bank activities such as an increase in the money supply to 
stimulate the domestic economy. The language calls for multiple remedies, “as appropriate,” 
including “cooperative mechanisms, enforceable rules, reporting, monitoring, transparency, or 
other means.”  
During floor consideration, the Senate considered and passed the so-called Hatch/Wyden 
amendment, which was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 70-29. This amendment sought to 
head off concerns that the language could be used to discourage central bank activities such as an 
increase in the money supply to stimulate the domestic economy, as well as to head off a currency 
amendment introduced by Senators Portman and Stabenow (defeated 48-51) that would have 
required the United States to negotiate “strong and enforceable rules against exchange rate 
manipulation,” enforceable through the dispute settlement system of a potential agreement. 
The Hatch/Wyden amendment modified the currency language of the bill as introduced, defining 
unfair currency practices as “protracted large scale intervention in one direction in the exchange 
market and a persistently undervalued foreign exchange rate to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage in trade.” The amended legislation seeks to “establish accountability” through potential 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions 
 
Congressional Research Service 10 
remedies such as “enforceable rules, transparency, reporting, monitoring, cooperative mechanism, 
or other means to address exchange rate manipulation.” The legislation, as engrossed by the 
Senate, contains the original negotiating objective as well as the language of the Hatch/Wyden 
amendment. 
How have discussions on trade agreements that were considered 
after the expiration of TPA-2002 contributed to objectives proposed 
for TPA-2015? 
On May 10, 2007, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders and the Bush Administration 
released a statement on agreed principles in five policy areas, which were to be reflected in 
provisions of four U.S. FTAs then being considered for ratification, with Colombia, Panama, 
Peru, and South Korea. The policy areas covered included worker rights, environment protection, 
intellectual property rights, government procurement, and foreign investment. This agreement has 
since been referred to as the “May 10th Agreement” (for details, see box on “The May 10th 
Agreement,” below). The extent to which these principles would be incorporated in negotiating 
objectives in any renewal of TPA authority, and reflected in future FTAs, has been a source of 
debate among policymakers.  
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The “May 10th Agreement”
The agreement of May 10th, 2007, was a bipartisan statement of agreed principles between the President and the 
House leadership on labor, environment, IPR, and foreign investment, which was to be applied to the four FTAs 
Congress would consider at that time: Columbia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea. 
Regarding worker rights, the May 10th Agreement (the Agreement) required the United States and FTA partners to 
commit to enforcing the five international labor principles enshrined in International Labor Organization’s (ILO’s) 
1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights At Work and that the commitment be enforceable under the FTA. 
These rights are the freedom of association, the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the 
elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor, the effective abolition of child labor, including the worst forms 
of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
The Agreement also required FTAs to adhere to seven major multilateral environmental agreements: the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species; the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances; the 
Convention on Marine Pollution; the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention; the Ramsar Convention on the 
Wetlands; the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; and the Convention on Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 
Furthermore, the parties were not to waive or otherwise derogate from their labor or environmental protection 
laws in a manner that would affect trade or investment with the FTA partner(s). In addition, the labor and 
environment provisions were to be enforceable, if consultation and other avenues fail, through the same dispute 
settlement procedures that apply to the other provisions in the FTA.  
The Agreement also required the FTAs to include provisions related to patents and approval of pharmaceuticals for 
marketing exclusivity with different requirements for developed and developing countries. Specifically, the Agreement 
requires provisions dealing with the effective period of data exclusivity (restrictions on the use of test data produced 
for market approval by generic drug producers); patent extensions; linkage of marketing approval of generic drugs to 
determination of possible patent infringement; and reaffirmation of adherence to the Doha Declaration on 
compulsory licensing of drugs to respond to public health crises. 
Regarding foreign investment, the Agreement required each of the FTAs to state that none of its provisions would 
accord foreign investors greater substantive rights in terms of foreign investment protection than are accorded U.S. 
investors in the United States.  
Are the provisions of the May 10th Agreement incorporated into the 
proposed TPA-2015? 
The proposed TPA-2015 incorporates the labor and environmental principles of the May 10th 
agreement, including requirements that a negotiating party’s labor and environmental statutes 
adhere to internationally recognized core labor standards and to obligations under common 
multilateral environmental agreements. The proposed TPA-2015 also includes the language of the 
May 10th agreement on investment, providing for “ensuring that foreign investors in the United 
States are not granted greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than U.S. 
investors in the United States.”  
The proposed TPA-2015 does not specifically refer to the language of the May 10th agreement on 
patent protection for pharmaceuticals, which were designed to achieve greater access to medicine 
in developing country FTA partners. Instead, the proposed TPA-2015 language seeks to “ensure 
that trade agreements foster innovation and access to medicine.” The included language 
seemingly could be used to justify either including or excluding such provisions in future FTAs. 
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Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
What are the key negotiating objectives concerning IPR? 
The United States has long supported the strengthening of intellectual property rights through 
trade agreements, and Congress has placed IPR protection as a principal negotiating objective 
since the 1988 grant of fast-track authority.11 The overall objectives on IPR under the 2002 TPA 
authority were the promotion of adequate and effective protection of IPR; market access for U.S. 
persons relying on IPR; and respect for the WTO Declaration on the Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and Public Health. This last objective addressed 
concerns for the effect of patent protection for pharmaceuticals on innovation and access to 
medicine, especially in developing countries.  
These objectives are largely reflected in the five objectives in the proposed TPA-2015. The 
promotion of adequate and effective protection of IPR through the negotiation of trade 
agreements that reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in U.S. law is a key 
provision, as are provisions for strong protection of new technologies, standards of protection that 
keep pace with technological developments, non-discrimination in the treatment of IPR, and 
strong enforcement of IPR. The proposed TPA-2015 also seeks to ensure that agreements 
negotiated foster innovation and access to medicine. 
Does the proposed TPA-2015 contain new IPR negotiating objectives? 
A new objective in the proposed TPA-2015 seeks to negotiate the prevention and elimination of 
government involvement in violations of IPR such as cybertheft or piracy. The enhanced 
protection of trade secrets and proprietary information collected by governments in the 
furtherance of regulations is contained in the negotiating objective on regulatory coherence.  
Labor and Environment 
How do the negotiating objectives on labor under the 2002 TPA compare to 
those of the proposed TPA-2015? 
Both the 2002 TPA and the proposed TPA-2015 include several negotiating objectives on labor 
issues and worker rights.12 While similar, they also differ in some fundamental ways. For 
example, the 2002 authority states that trade agreements are to ensure that a trading partner does 
not fail effectively to enforce its own labor statutes. The proposed TPA-2015 requires that the 
United States ensure not only that a trading partner enforce its own labor statutes but also that 
those statutes include internationally recognized core labor standards as defined in the bill to 
mean the “core labor standards only as stated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
                                                 
11 For additional information, please see CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, 
by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson, and CRS In Focus IF10033, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and 
International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson. 
12 For more information, please see CRS In Focus IF10046, Worker Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), by Mary Jane Bolle and Ian F. Fergusson. 
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and Rights to Work and its Follow-Up (1998).”13 It also states that parties shall not waive or 
derogate from internationally recognized core labor standards in a manner affecting trade or 
investment between the United States and the parties to an agreement.  
In addition, the 2002 TPA allowed some discretion on the part of a trading partner government in 
enforcing its laws and stated that the government would be considered fulfilling its obligations if 
it exercised discretion, either through action or inaction, reasonably. The proposed TPA-2015, on 
the other hand, states that while the government retains discretion in implementing its labor 
statutes, the exercise of that discretion is not a reason not to comply with its obligations under the 
trade agreement. The labor—and environmental—provisions also contain language to strengthen 
the capacity of trading partners to adhere to labor and environmental standards, as well as a 
provision to reduce or eliminate policies that unduly threaten sustainable development.  
How do the environmental negotiating objectives under the proposed TPA-
2015 compare to those of the 2002 TPA? 
Like the labor negotiating objectives, the proposed TPA-2015 provides not only that a party 
enforce its own environmental standards as in the 2002 Act, but also that those laws be consistent 
with seven internationally recognized multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and other 
provisions. It also contains the abovementioned prohibition of waiver or derogation from 
environmental law in matters of trade and investment. The environmental objective contains 
language allowing a reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion in enforcement and allocation 
of resources: language similar to, but seemingly more flexible than, that included in the labor 
provisions.14 
Would the labor and environmental provisions negotiated be subject to the 
same dispute settlement provisions as other parts of the agreement? 
The proposed TPA-2015 commits negotiators “to ensure that enforceable labor and environmental 
standards are subject to the same dispute settlement and remedies as other enforceable provisions 
under the agreement.” Under the most recent U.S. trade agreements, this could mean the 
withdrawal of trade concessions as an end result until a dispute is resolved. By contrast, the 2002 
TPA provided separate remedies under dispute settlement, including the use of monetary penalties 
and technical assistance.  
                                                 
13 The ILO declaration lists these core labor principles as: the freedom of association and the effective recognition of 
the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; the effective abolition of 
child labor and the prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation. 
14 See CRS In Focus IF10166, Environmental Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), by Richard K. Lattanzio 
and Ian F. Fergusson. 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions 
 
Congressional Research Service 14 
Regulatory Practices 
How does the proposed TPA-2015 seek to address regulatory practices? 
The regulatory practices negotiation objective seeks to reduce or eliminate the use of 
governmental regulations (non-tariff barriers)—such as discriminatory certification requirements 
or non-transparent health and safety standards—from impeding market access for U.S. goods, 
services, or investment. Like the 2002 TPA, it attempts to obtain commitments in trade 
agreements that proposed regulations would be based on scientific principles, cost-benefit risk 
assessment, or other objective, non-discriminatory standards. It also seeks more transparency and 
participation by affected parties in the development of regulations, consultative mechanisms to 
increase regulatory coherence, regulatory compatibility through harmonization or mutual 
recognition, and convergence in the standards-development process. A new provision in the 
proposed TPA-2015 seeks to limit governmental collection of undisclosed proprietary data—
“except to satisfy a legitimate and justifiable regulatory interest”—and protects that data against 
public disclosure.  
Does the proposed TPA-2015 address drug pricing and reimbursement issues? 
Yes, the regulatory practices negotiating objective contains language applicable to a foreign 
country’s drug pricing system. The proposed TPA-2015 seeks to eliminate government price 
controls and reference prices “which deny full market access for United States products.” The 
proposed TPA-2015 also seeks to ensure that regulatory regimes adhere to principles of 
transparency, procedural fairness, and non-discrimination.  
Dispute Settlement (DS)  
What are the principal negotiating objectives on DS in FTAs? 
TPA legislation has sought to establish DS mechanisms to resolve disputes first through 
consultation, then by the withdrawal of benefits to encourage compliance with trade agreement 
commitments. TPA-2015 also seeks provisions to apply the principal negotiating objectives in 
TPA equally through equivalent access, procedures, and remedies. This obligation would, in 
practice, allow for full dispute settlement of labor and environmental disputes under the 
agreement.  
How did TPA address DS at the WTO? 
The proposed TPA-2015, like its predecessors, also seeks to ensure that WTO DS panels and its 
appeals venue, the Appellate Body, “apply the WTO Agreement as written, without adding to or 
diminishing rights and obligations under the agreement,” and use a standard of review applicable 
to the Uruguay Round Agreement in question, “including greater deference, where appropriate, to 
the fact finding and technical expertise of national investigating authorities.” These provisions 
address the perception by some Members of Congress that the WTO dispute settlement bodies 
have interpreted WTO agreements in ways not foreseen or reflected in the agreement.  
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New Issues Addressed in the Proposed TPA-2015 
What new negotiating objectives are contained in the proposed TPA-2015? 
Digital Trade in Goods and Services and Cross-Border Data Flows 
The Internet not only has become a facilitator of international trade in goods and services given 
its borderless nature, but also is itself a source of trade in digital services such as search engines 
or data storage. At the same time, however, digital trade and cross-border data flows have 
increasingly become the target of trade restricting measures, especially in emerging markets. The 
digital trade provisions update and expand upon the e-commerce provisions from the 2002 TPA 
that call for trade in digital goods and services to be treated no less favorably than corresponding 
physical goods or services in terms of applicability of trade agreements, the classification of a 
good or service, or regulation. Aside from ensuring that governments refrain from enacting 
measures impeding digital trade in goods and services, the proposed TPA-2015 extends that 
commitment to cross-border data flows, data processing, and data storage. It also calls for 
enhanced protection of trade secrets and proprietary information collected by governments in the 
furtherance of regulations. The promotion of strong IPR for technologies to facilitate digital trade 
is included in the IPR objectives, which would extend the existing WTO moratorium on duties on 
electronic commerce transactions.  
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
U.S. firms often face competition from state-owned or state-influenced firms. The proposed TPA-
2015 principal negotiating objective for SOEs seeks to ensure that SOEs are not favored with 
discriminatory purchases or subsidies and that competition is based on commercial considerations 
in order that U.S. firms may compete on a “level playing field.” While current TPP negotiations 
include countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam, with a significant SOE presence, 
such language may also pertain to future negotiations covered under the proposed TPA-2015, 
including possibly with other countries with large SOE sectors such as China or India. 
Localization 
The proposed TPA-2015 adds a principal negotiating objective on “localization,” the practice by 
which firms are required to locate facilities, intellectual property, services, or assets in a country 
as a condition of doing business. While localization can be motivated by privacy and security 
interests, there are concerns that such measures can be trade distorting and may be used for 
protectionist purposes. TPA-2015 would direct U.S. negotiators to prevent and eliminate such 
practices, as well as the practice of indigenous innovation, where a country seeks to develop local 
technology by the enforced use of domestic standards or local content. The digital trade 
objectives described above also include localization provisions concerning the free flow of data. 
Localization barriers are also addressed in the foreign investment chapter with provisions to 
restrict or eliminate performance requirements or forced technology transfers in the establishment 
or operation of U.S. investments abroad. 
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Human Rights  
The proposed TPA-2015 contains an overall negotiating objective to ensure the implementation of 
trade commitments through promotion of good governance, transparency, and the rule of law with 
U.S. trade partners, “which are important parts of the broader effort to create more open 
democratic societies and to promote respect for internationally recognized human rights.” TPA-
2015 does not contain any affirmative commitments on human rights. During floor consideration, 
the Senate adopted unopposed an amendment by Senator Lankford to add an overall negotiating 
objective to "take into account conditions relating to religious freedom of any party to 
negotiations for a trade agreement with the United States." 
What New Negotiating Objectives Were Added in Committee Markup? 
In its markup of S. 995 on April 22, 2015, the Senate Finance Committee adopted three 
amendments to the legislation. These amendments were adopted as a procedural amendment in 
the markup of H.R. 1890 by the House Ways and Means Committee the next day. These 
amendments would accomplish the following: 
• Make the overall negotiating objective on human rights (see above) a principal 
negotiating objective. As with the other principal negotiating objectives, 
expedited procedures can be conditioned on progress toward achieving these 
objectives.  
• Discourage potential trading partners from adopting policies to limit trade or 
investment relations with Israel. This amendment is specific to the Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership. 
• Another amendment to the bills reported by both committees would prohibit 
expedited consideration of trade agreements with countries ranked in the most 
problematic category of countries for human trafficking concerns (Tier III) of the 
annual report by the Department of State on Trafficking in Persons. Currently, 
Malaysia is the only country so ranked with which the United States is engaged 
in FTA negotiations. 
 
Congressional Consultation and Advisory 
Requirements 
The consultative, notification, and reporting requirements of TPA are designed to achieve greater 
transparency in trade negotiations and to maintain the role of Congress in shaping trade policy. 
Congress has required the executive branch to consult with Congress prior to and during trade 
negotiations, as well as upon their completion and the signing of (entering into) a trade 
agreement. TPA/fast track statutes have required the USTR to meet and consult with the House 
Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and other committees that would 
have jurisdiction over laws possibly affected by trade negotiations.  
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How do the provisions on consultations in the proposed TPA-2015 
compare with previous statutes?  
While many of the provisions on consultation have some precedent in past grants of TPA in terms 
of advisory structure and transparency commitments, TPA-2015 contains some new provisions. 
These provisions require: 
• The appointment of a Chief Transparency Officer at USTR. This official would 
be required “to consult with Congress on transparency policy, coordinate 
transparency in trade negotiations, engage and assist the public, and advise the 
U.S. Trade Representative on transparency policy.”  
• That USTR make available, prior to initiating FTA negotiations with a new 
country, “a detailed and comprehensive summary of the specific objectives with 
respect to the negotiations, and a description of how the agreement, if 
successfully concluded, will further those objectives and benefit the United 
States.” 
• That the President publicly release the assessment by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC) of the potential impact of the trade agreement (see below), 
which was not the case under the previous authority. 
• That USTR consult with committees of jurisdiction after accepting a petition for 
review or taking enforcement actions in regard to potential violation of a trade 
agreement. 
• The release of the negotiating text to the public prior to the agreement’s being 
signed by the Administration. In addition, the final text of the implementing 
legislation and a draft Statement of Administrative Action must be submitted to 
Congress 30 days prior to its introduction. 
What are the Congressional Advisory Groups (CAGs) on 
Negotiations?  
The proposed TPA-2015 includes consultation requirements similar to those under the 2002 TPA 
and previous trade negotiating authorities. The proposed TPA-2015 provides for the establishment 
of separate Congressional Advisory Groups on Negotiations (CAGs) for each house—a House 
Advisory Group on Negotiations (HAG), chaired by the chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee, and a Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations (SAG), chaired by the chairman of the 
Finance Committee. In addition to the chairmen, each CAG would include the ranking Member 
and three additional Members from the respective committee, no more than two of whom could 
be from the same political party. Each CAG would also include the chair and ranking Member, or 
their designees, of committees of the respective chamber with jurisdiction over laws that could 
possibly be affected by the trade agreements. The CAGs likely would replace the Congressional 
Oversight Group (COG), a bicameral group with similar membership created under the 2002 TPA 
that reportedly met infrequently.  
For the CAGs, as the designated congressional advisory group for negotiations, the USTR would 
be required to develop guidelines “to facilitate the useful and timely exchange of information 
between them and the Trade Representative.” These guidelines would include fixed-timetable 
briefings and access by members of the CAG and their cleared staffers to pertinent negotiating 
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documents. The President also would be required to meet with either group upon the request of 
the majority of that group prior to launching negotiations or at any time during the negotiations. 
TPA-2015 mandates that the USTR draw up several sets of guidelines to enhance consultations 
with Congress, the private sector Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (see 
below), sectoral and industry advisory groups, and the public at large. USTR would be required to 
produce the guidelines, in consultation with the chairmen and ranking Members of the Senate 
Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee, no later than 120 days after the 
proposed TPA-2015 enters into force. The guidelines are to provide for timely briefings on the 
negotiating objectives for any specific trade agreement, the status of the negotiations, and any 
changes in laws that might be required to implement the trade agreement. In addition, the 
proposed TPA-2015 requires the USTR to consult on trade negotiations with any Member of 
Congress who requests to do so.  
Who are Designated Congressional Advisors? 
Designated Congressional Advisors (DCAs) are Members of Congress who are accredited as 
official advisers to U.S. delegations to trade negotiations. Under Section 161 the Trade Act of 
1974, as amended, the Speaker of the House selects five Members from the Ways and Means 
Committee (no more than three of whom are to be of the same political party), and the President 
Pro Tempore of the Senate selects five Members from the Senate Finance Committee (no more 
than three of whom can be of the same political party), as DCAs.15 In addition, the Speaker and 
the Senate President Pro Tempore may each designate as DCAs members of committees that 
would have jurisdiction over matters that are the subject of trade policy considerations or trade 
negotiations. Members of the CAG who are not already DCAs may also become DCA members.  
Under the proposed TPA-2015, in addition to the above, any Member of the House may be 
designated by the Speaker as a DCA upon consultation with the chairman and ranking Member of 
the House Ways and Means Committee and the chairman and ranking Member of the committee 
from which the Member would be selected. Similarly, any Member of the Senate may be 
designated a DCA upon consultation with the President Pro Tempore and the chairman and 
ranking Member of the committee from which the Senator would be selected. In addition, USTR 
would accredit members of the HAG and SAG as official trade advisers to U.S. trade negotiation 
delegations by the USTR.  
Which Members of Congress have access to draft trade agreements 
and related trade negotiating documents? 
Under the authority of Executive Order 13526, the USTR gives classified status to draft texts of 
trade agreements. According to USTR, nevertheless, any Member may examine draft trade 
agreements and related trade negotiating documents, although the 2002 TPA did not explicitly 
provide for this practice. The proposed TPA-2015 expressly requires that the USTR provide 
Members and their appropriate staff, as well as appropriate committee staff, access to pertinent 
documents relating to trade negotiations, including classified materials.  
                                                 
15 The appointment power of the President pro tempore of the Senate is subject to the conditions of 2 U.S.C. 199, which 
requires involvement of the majority and minority leaders if a statute specifies that the appointment is to be made on 
the basis of the appointee’s affiliation with a political party, or if not, upon the joint recommendation of the Senate 
majority and minority leaders. 
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What are the requirements to consult with the private sector and 
the public on trade policy? 
In order to ensure that private and public stakeholders have a voice in the formation of U.S. trade 
policy, Congress established a three-tier advisory committee system under Section 135 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, as amended. These committees advise the President on negotiations, 
agreements, and other matters of trade policy. At the top of the system is the 30-member Advisory 
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) consisting of presidentially appointed 
representatives from local and state governments and representatives from the broad range of 
U.S. industries and labor. At the second tier are policy advisory committees—Trade and 
Environment Policy, Intergovernmental Policy, Labor Policy, Agriculture Policy, and Africa.16 
The third tier consists of 17 sector-specific committees—1 on agriculture and 16 on industry—
which provide technical advice. In addition to consultations with the advisory committees, the 
USTR solicits the views of stakeholders through Federal Register notices and hearings. 
The TPA/fast track authorities under the Trade Act of 1974 and thereafter have required the 
President to submit reports from the various advisory committees on their views regarding the 
potential impact of an agreement negotiated under the TPA before the agreement is submitted for 
congressional approval. For example, the 2002 TPA requires the President to submit to Congress 
the reports of the advisory committees on a trade agreement no later than 30 calendar days after 
notifying Congress of his intent to enter into (sign) the trade agreement. Those reports are also 
required under the proposed TPA-2015. 
The proposed TPA-2015 expands the existing statutory requirements for consultation with the 
public. For example, the legislation requires the USTR to develop guidelines for enhanced 
consultation with the public and to provide these guidelines no later than 120 calendar days after 
the legislation’s entry into effect. The legislation also requires the USTR to develop guidelines on 
consultations with the private sector advisory committees no later than 120 days after the 
legislation’s entry into effect. The President also would be required to make public other 
mandated reports on the impact of future trade agreements on the environment, employment, and 
labor rights in the United States (see below.) 
Do specific import sensitive industries have special negotiation 
and consultation requirements? 
Under the 2002 Trade Act and the proposed TPA-2015, import sensitive products17 in the 
agriculture, fishing, and textile sectors have special assessment and consultation requirements 
before initiating negotiations. 
                                                 
16 On February 18, USTR Froman announced the formation of a Public Interest Advisory Committee (PIAC) that will 
advise the Administration on issues of public health, consumer protection and transparency in trade negotiations.  
17 Import sensitive products are those with tariff rates above 5% or subject to a tariff rate quota (“TRQ,” described 
above).  
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Notification and Reporting Requirements 
Another tool Congress has employed under TPA to ensure transparency of the negotiating process 
is to require the President to notify Congress prior to launching trade negotiations and prior to 
entering into (signing) a trade agreement. 
Would congressional notification requirements change under the 
proposed TPA-2015? 
TPA-2002 required the President to notify Congress 90 calendar days prior to initiating 
negotiations on a reciprocal trade agreement with a foreign country. The President was also 
required to notify Congress 90 calendar days prior to entering into (signing) a trade agreement 
and to notify Congress 60 days prior to entering into the agreement of any expected changes in 
U.S. law that would be required in order to be in compliance with the trade agreement. In 
addition, 180 calendar days prior to entering into a trade agreement, the President had to notify 
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee of any changes in U.S. 
trade remedy laws (discussed earlier) that would be required by the trade agreement. The 2002 
Act also stipulated special notification and reporting requirements for agriculture, fishing 
industry, and textiles and apparel. The proposed TPA-2015 maintains these requirements.  
What is the role of the U.S. International Trade Commission? 
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) is an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency 
with broad investigative responsibilities on matters related to international trade. One of its 
analytic functions is to examine and assess international trade agreements. Under TPA-2002, the 
President had to submit the details of the proposed agreement to the ITC 90 calendar days prior to 
entering into (signing) the agreement. The ITC was required to produce an assessment of the 
potential economic impact of the agreement no later than 90 calendar days after the agreement 
was entered into. The proposed TPA-2015 incorporates the same requirement, but extends the 
deadline for the ITC to produce the report by 15 calendar days to 105 days and requires that the 
reports be made public.  
What are the various reporting requirements under the proposed 
TPA-2015? 
Several reporting requirements were established in past TPA legislation; TPA-2015 maintains 
similar requirements and establishes new ones. These include:  
• Extension disapproval resolution (see below). If the President seeks to extend the 
trade authorities procedures beyond July 1, 2018,  
• The President must report to Congress on the status and progress of current 
negotiations, and why the extension is needed to complete the negotiations. 
Must be submitted no later than April 1, 2018. 
• The Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations must report on 
the progress made in the negotiations and a statement of its views on whether 
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the extension should be granted. Must be submitted no later than June 1, 
2018. 
• The International Trade Commission (ITC) must report on the economic 
impact of all trade agreements negotiated during the current period TPA is in 
force. Must be submitted no later than June 1, 2018. 
• Report on U.S. trade remedy laws. The President must report on any proposals 
that could change U.S. trade remedy laws to the committees of jurisdiction 
(House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee). Must 
be submitted 180 days before an agreement is signed. 
• Entering into an agreement. 
• Advisory Committee Reports. The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 
Negotiations and appropriate policy, sectoral, and functional committees 
must report on whether and to what extent the agreement would promote the 
economic interests of the United States, and the overall and principal 
negotiating objectives of TPA. Must be submitted 30 days after an agreement 
is signed. 
• ITC Assessment. The ITC must report on the likely impact of the agreement 
on the economy as a whole and on specific economic sectors. The President 
must provide information to the ITC on the agreement as it exists no later 
than 90 days before an agreement is signed (entered into) to inform the 
assessment. The ITC must report to Congress within 105 days after the 
agreement is signed. This report would be made public under TPA-2015. 
• Reports to be submitted by the President to committees of jurisdiction in relation 
to each trade agreement.  
• Environment review of the agreement and the content and operation of 
consultative mechanisms established pursuant to TPA. 
• Employment Impact Reviews and Report. Reviews the impact of future trade 
agreement on U.S. employment and labor markets. 
• Labor Rights. A “meaningful” labor rights report on the country or countries 
in the negotiations and a description of any provisions that would require 
changes to the labor laws and practices of the United States. 
• Implementation and Enforcement. A plan for the implementation and 
enforcement of the agreement, including border personnel requirements, 
agency staffing requirements, customs infrastructure requirements, impact on 
state and local governments, and cost analyses. 
• Report on Penalties. A report one year after the imposition of a penalty or remedy 
under the trade agreement on the effectiveness of the penalty or remedy applied 
in enforcing U.S. law, whether the penalty or remedy was effective in changing 
the behavior of the party, and whether it had any adverse impact on other parties 
or interests. 
• Report on TPA. The ITC is to submit a report on the economic impact of all trade 
agreements implemented under TPA procedures since 1984 one year after 
enactment and no later than five years thereafter. 
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Expedited Procedures and the Congressional Role 
Do the expedited legislative procedures differ under the proposed 
TPA-2015? 
The proposed TPA-2015 makes use of the existing expedited procedures (“trade authorities 
procedures”) prescribed in Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 for consideration of trade 
agreement implementing bills (see the text box).  
Trade Authorities Procedures
Under Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2191), an implementing bill submitted by the President is 
automatically introduced in both chambers and referred to the appropriate committees of jurisdiction (normally 
Ways and Means in the House and Finance in the Senate, perhaps along with others). In each chamber, the 
committees have 45 session days to report the bill back to the floor, and they may not amend it or recommend 
amendments. If either committee does not report after 45 session days, it is discharged from considering the 
implementing bill, which makes the bill available for floor action (days on which the respective chamber does not 
meet are not counted toward the 45-day period).  
In each chamber, once the committee reports or is discharged, the implementing bill may be called up for 
consideration by a non-debatable motion, offered from the floor by any Member. In the House, this provision means 
that no special rule from the Committee on Rules is necessary in order to bring the bill to the floor; in the Senate, it 
means that Senators need not defer to the majority leader to call up the bill, and no super-majority vote is needed to 
limit debate on a motion to consider the legislation.  
In each chamber, once the measure is under consideration, debate is limited to 20 hours, no amendments may be 
considered, and various potentially dilatory motions are prohibited. In the Senate, this limit on debate means that no 
super-majority vote will be needed to overcome a filibuster. Each chamber can pass the implementing bill by a 
majority of the Members voting. If either chamber passes its bill, it sends the bill to the other; the receiving chamber 
then considers its own implementing bill under the expedited procedure, but takes its final vote on the bill received 
from the first. Because neither chamber can amend the implementing bill, the two bills must remain identical; as a 
result, if the chamber acting second passes the bill received from the other, this action clears the bill for the 
President’s signature.  
Most trade agreements affect tariffs, in which case the implementing bill will be a revenue bill, which, under the 
Constitution, must be enacted as a House bill. In this case the House must act first, and send its bill to the Senate, 
where it is referred to committee. The Senate committee is automatically discharged from considering the House bill 
if it does not report it within 15 session days, or by the end of the 45 session days allowed for considering its own 
bill, whichever is later. After the committee reports the House bill or is discharged, the Senate then may consider 
that measure under the expedited procedure.  
What is the purpose of the expedited procedures for considering 
implementing bills? 
The expedited TPA procedures include three core elements: a mechanism to ensure timely floor 
consideration, limits on debate, and a prohibition on amendment. The guarantee of floor 
consideration is intended to ensure that Congress will have an opportunity to consider and vote on 
the implementing bill whether or not the committees of jurisdiction or the leadership favor the 
legislation. Especially in the Senate, the limitation on debate helps ensure that opponents cannot 
prevent a final vote on an implementation bill by filibustering. The prohibition on amendments is 
intended to ensure that Congress will vote on the implementing bill in the form in which it is 
presented to Congress.  
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In these ways, the expedited procedures help assure that Congress will act on an implementing 
bill, and that if the bill is enacted, its terms will implement the trade agreement that was 
negotiated. This arrangement helps to increase the confidence of U.S. negotiating partners that 
law enacted by the United States will implement the terms of the agreement, so that they will not 
be compelled to renegotiate it or give up on it.  
Why do the expedited procedures for implementing bills 
prohibit amendments? 
As noted above, if Congress were to amend an implementing bill, the legislation ultimately 
enacted might fail to implement the terms of the agreement that had actually been agreed. In 
addition, if either house were to amend the implementing bill, it would probably become 
necessary to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions through a conference 
committee (or through amendments between the houses). Since there is no way to force the two 
houses to reach an agreement on a single version, this prospect would make it impossible to 
ensure that Congress could complete action on the implementing bill expeditiously or, indeed, at 
all. 
What provisions are to be included in a trade agreement 
implementing bill to make it eligible for expedited consideration? 
Because trade agreement implementing bills are eligible for expedited congressional 
consideration under TPA, Congress has imposed restrictions on what may be included in these 
bills. The 2002 TPA legislation required that the implementing bill consist only of provisions that 
approve the trade agreement and a statement of administrative action proposed to implement it, 
together with provisions “necessary or appropriate” to implement the agreement, “repealing or 
amending existing laws or providing new statutory authority.”  
What constitutes “necessary or appropriate” has been the subject of debate, with some Members 
arguing that the terms should not be interpreted too loosely, while others may argue for a broader 
interpretation. The proposed TPA-2015 includes the same basic language as the 2002 authority, 
except it requires that, in addition to provisions approving the trade agreement and statement of 
administrative action, an implementing bill may include “only such provisions as are strictly 
necessary or appropriate” (italics added).18 
Along with the draft implementing bill, what other documents 
must the President submit to Congress for approval?  
Along with a draft implementing bill, the President submits to Congress a Statement of 
Administrative Action (SAA) and other supporting information. An SAA contains an authoritative 
expression of Administration views regarding the interpretation and application of the trade 
agreement for purposes of U.S. international obligations and domestic law. It describes significant 
administrative actions to be taken to implement the trade agreement. To support this statement, 
                                                 
18 S. 995 and H.R. 1890, §3(b)(3).  
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the President submits an explanation of how the implementing bill and administrative action will 
“change or affect U.S. law.”19 
The President is also to submit with the draft implementing bill a statement explaining how the 
agreement makes progress in achieving the “purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives” of the 
TPA, whether it changes an agreement previously negotiated, and how it “serves the interests of 
United States commerce,” as well as how the implementing bill meets the requirement that its 
provisions altering existing law are “strictly necessary or appropriate.”20 
How does the proposed TPA-2015 treat agreements reached under 
the sets of negotiations already launched? 
For the TPP, the TTIP, and the TISA negotiations (see above), the proposed TPA-2015 would 
waive the requirement of notification 90 calendar days prior to launching the negotiations, 
provided that the President notifies Congress of the negotiating objectives of each agreement and 
whether he is seeking a new agreement or changes in an existing agreement. (For these 
negotiations, the Obama Administration has already been carrying out notifications and 
consultations similar to those required by the expired 2002 authority.) 
If Congress renews TPA, must it consider covered trade agreements 
under the expedited legislative procedures? 
Each renewal of TPA has provided means by which Congress can determine not to extend 
expedited consideration to certain implementing bills. In the 2002 statute, these mechanisms 
included the following: 
• The “Extension Disapproval Resolution,” through which Congress can deny a 
presidential request to extend TPA for additional years;  
• The “Procedural Disapproval Resolution,” through which Congress can deny 
expedited consideration for a specified trade agreement; and 
• An additional procedure, under which Congress could find that an implementing 
bill would change U.S. trade remedy laws in ways inconsistent with negotiating 
objectives on that subject.  
The proposed TPA-2015 retains all three of these mechanisms, and would also establish  
• A “Consultation and Compliance Resolution,” through which either house, by its 
own action, can deny the use of TPA procedures for consideration of a specified 
implementing bill in that chamber.  
Finally,  
                                                 
19 S. 995 and H.R. 1890, §6(a)(1)(E). 
20 S. 995 and H.R. 1890, §6(a)(2)(A). 
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• Each house always retains its constitutional authority to override the statutory 
requirements of the TPA procedures and consider an implementing bill under its 
general rules or such other procedural conditions as it may determine.  
Following paragraphs discuss how each of these mechanisms functions to enable Congress to 
limit the use of TPA, implications of each, and relations among them.  
What is the effect of an “Extension Disapproval Resolution”? 
As already noted, the proposed TPA-2015 would make the expedited procedures available until 
July 1, 2018, and would authorize the President to request that this period be extended through 
June 30, 2021. The President could make such a request at any time through June 30, 2018, but 
the extension would be denied if, before that date, either house adopts an “extension disapproval 
resolution” (EDR).21 This provision would enable either house to deny TPA altogether for any 
trade agreement entered into (signed) after June 30, 2018. The 2002 renewal and other earlier 
TPA statutes contained similar provisions for an extension and EDR.  
Like previous grants of TPA, the proposed TPA-2015 effectively places the use of the EDR in the 
control of the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance. Although any 
Member of the respective house may introduce an EDR, such a resolution may be considered on 
the floor in each chamber only if the respective revenue committee (and, in the House, the 
Committee on Rules) reports it. If reported, however, the measure can be considered under an 
expedited procedure of its own, known as the “Section 152 procedure,” which makes privileged a 
motion for consideration, limits debate, and prohibits amendment at any stage of the process.22 
What is the effect of a “Procedural Disapproval Resolution”? 
Under both the 2002 authority and the proposed TPA-2015, Congress may withdraw expedited 
legislative consideration from a particular implementing bill if it determines either (1) that the 
President has not adequately notified or consulted Congress on that agreement in the ways 
required by the act, or (2) that the agreement “fails to make progress in achieving the purposes, 
policies, priorities, and objectives” of the act. If both houses, within 60 days of each other, adopt 
a “procedural disapproval resolution” (PDR) on the same implementing bill, neither can use the 
expedited procedure to consider that implementing bill. In each chamber, the PDR is a simple 
resolution (H.Res. or S.Res.), requiring action only in the chamber of origin, so that no 
conference committee or other mechanism to resolve differences between the two chambers’ 
measures is needed. Like an EDR, a PDR can be considered in each chamber under the expedited 
procedure of Section 152 (see previous paragraph), with a privileged motion for consideration, 
limited debate, and a prohibition on amendment.23  
This mechanism affords Congress a means to enforce the requirements that a trade agreement 
advance the negotiating objectives established in statute and that the specified consultations, 
which enable Congress to engage with the process of negotiation, will occur. If, in the judgment 
of both houses, these conditions are not met, then Congress can decide not to accord expedited 
                                                 
21 S. 995 and H.R. 1890, §3(c). 
22 §§152(d) and (e) of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e).  
23 S. 995 and H.R. 1890, §§6(b)(1) and 6(b)(2). 
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consideration to the implementing bill.24 As with the EDR, however, the proposed TPA-2015 (like 
the 2002 statute) effectively places the use of the PDR in the control of the Committee on Ways 
and Means and the Committee on Finance. Any Member of the respective house may introduce 
the resolution, but it may be considered on the floor only if the respective revenue committee 
(and, in the House, the Committee on Rules) reports it. In this way the revenue committees serve, 
in effect, as the agent of Congress in maintaining its legislative prerogatives.  
With respect to a given trade agreement, moreover, the expedited procedure for considering a 
PDR may be used only for the first such resolution reported in each chamber. The effect of this 
limitation is that each chamber may attempt to withdraw expedited consideration from an 
implementing bill on a given trade agreement under this procedure only once. (Further 
implications of this limitation are noted in the later discussion on changes in trade remedy laws.)  
What is a “mock markup,” and how may Congress use it to assert 
control over a trade agreement implementing bill? 
Although not embedded in statute, a “mock markup” has been an informal, traditional method for 
the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee to provide advice on the 
contents of the implementing bill before the President formally sends the draft bill to both houses, 
thus triggering the expedited procedure for the bill. Subsequent to the signing of the agreement, 
the committees generally conduct hearings on a draft implementing bill sent by the White House, 
followed by the advisory “markup.” If the versions produced by the House and Senate 
Committees have significant differences, the two panels might hold a “mock conference.”  
This process is purely advisory, and it is at presidential discretion whether to accept the advice. 
The process is called a “mock” markup because the bill under consideration is only a draft, and 
the action of the committees operates only as a signal of their preferences to the executive. Often, 
nevertheless, the implementing bill that the President later submits to Congress tracks the results 
of the mock markup. If the revenue committees are dissatisfied with the implementing bill as 
submitted, they may respond by asking Congress to deny expedited consideration through the use 
of a PDR or one of the other methods described next, including bringing the bill to the floor under 
the general rules rather than the statutory expedited procedures.  
What may Congress do if an implementing bill contains provisions 
inconsistent with negotiating objectives on trade remedies, and 
with what effect? 
The proposed TPA-2015 retains a procedural mechanism that appeared in the 2002 authority, 
under which either house can adopt a simple resolution (H.Res. or S.Res.) finding that changes to 
U.S. trade remedy laws provided for in a trade agreement implementing bill submitted by the 
President are inconsistent with statutory negotiating objectives on that subject. Such action would 
respond to the report by the President to the revenue committees on this subject mentioned under 
“Trade Remedies,” above. Like a PDR, such a resolution could be introduced by any Member, 
                                                 
24 If a PDR becomes effective, the two houses could still consider the implementing bill under their general rules; see 
“May Congress override the expedited procedures?” later. 
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but could receive floor consideration only if reported by the respective revenue committee (and, 
in the House, by the Committee on Rules). If the respective committees had not previously 
reported any other such resolution with respect to the same agreement, the resolution would be 
subject to consideration under the expedited procedure of Section 152 (see “What is the effect of 
an “Extension Disapproval Resolution”?”).25  
Unlike a PDR, however, the proposed TPA-2015 (like the 2002 authority) does not specify what 
effect the adoption of a such resolution, finding an implementing bill inconsistent with trade 
remedy objectives, would have on consideration of the implementing bill. As a result, it is not 
clear that adoption of a resolution of this kind would prevent either chamber from considering the 
implementing bill under its expedited procedure. Yet the proposed TPA-2015 (again like the 2002 
authority) prescribes that if such a resolution has been reported in either chamber, then that 
chamber may not use the Section 152 expedited procedure to consider a PDR to deny expedited 
consideration to the same implementing bill.26  
How would TPA-2015 permit a single house to withdraw expedited 
consideration from a specific implementation bill? 
The proposed TPA-2015 incorporates a mechanism, not present in previous TPA statutes, that 
would permit either house, by its own action, to make a given implementing bill ineligible for 
expedited consideration in that chamber. As with the PDR, the emphasis of this proposal is on its 
potential use to counter what the chamber may consider inadequate consultation by the executive 
branch with respect to a trade agreement. This mechanism provides for use of a “Consultation and 
Compliance Resolution” (CCR), which is a simple resolution of either chamber (S.Res. or 
H.Res.) asserting that the President had “failed or refused to notify or consult” as required by the 
Act, and therefore that “the trade authorities procedures ... shall not apply” in that chamber to the 
implementing bill in question.27  
This form of action, however, contrasts with the use of the PDR, which has the effect of 
withdrawing expedited consideration in both chambers, but only if both agree to similar 
resolutions. Withdrawal of expedited consideration in only one chamber, nevertheless, would 
presumably suffice to prevent the effective operation of the expedited procedure as a whole, for 
the acting chamber might then either decline to consider the implementing bill at all, or might 
never bring consideration to a close and proceed to a vote, or might amend the bill, in which case 
a conference committee or other process of resolving differences between the two houses might 
become necessary, and might never be concluded.  
The proposed TPA-2015 provides separate procedures for a CCR in each chamber, and does not 
provide for expedited consideration in either. In the Senate, if the Committee on Finance “meets 
on whether to report an implementing bill,” but does not report it favorably, it must then, instead, 
report a CCR. The Senate is not required to consider this resolution, but if a motion is offered to 
proceed to its consideration, it would normally be debatable, and could be filibustered, in which 
case a motion for cloture could be offered in order to limit consideration. The proposed TPA-2015 
provides that if this motion does not receive the 60 votes necessary for adoption, the resolution is 
                                                 
25 S. 995 and H.R. 1890, §5(b)(3). 
26 S. 995 and H.R. 1890, §6(b)(2)(B). 
27 S. 995 and H.R. 1890, §§6(b)(3)(C) and 6(b)(4)(C). 
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returned to committee,28 thereby preserving the eligibility of the implementing bill for expedited 
consideration. In order for the Senate to withdraw expedited consideration from an implementing 
bill under this procedure, accordingly, the resolution would have to secure the support of 60 
Senators for cloture (unless opponents permitted the motion to consider the resolution, and then 
the resolution itself, to come to a vote without cloture). In addition, a cloture vote does not occur 
until two days after the cloture motion is offered, a matter under cloture may be considered for 30 
additional hours after the cloture vote, and if the Senate agrees to the motion to proceed, the same 
conditions apply to consideration of the measure itself. As a result, adoption of a CCR in the 
Senate might require Senators to be willing to spend as much as two days getting to a cloture 
vote, plus 30 hours consideration, plus another two days until a cloture vote on the resolution 
itself, plus a further 30 hours consideration before a final vote on the resolution.  
In the House, the CCR process is triggered if the Committee on Ways and Means reports an 
implementing bill “with other than a favorable recommendation.” If, on the day after the 
Committee files such a report, a Member of the House submits a CCR, the committee must 
consider one such resolution within the next four days of session and report it within six days of 
session or be discharged from its consideration.29 The act does not specify how such a resolution 
would then reach the floor or under what terms it would be considered. Normally, a resolution 
affecting the order of business (often called a “special rule”) would be considered by the 
Committee on Rules and reported as privileged, which means the committee could call it up by 
motion. In the past, when the House wished to withdraw expedited consideration from an 
implementing bill, it has used such resolutions reported by the Committee on Rules, as described 
below. 
Does Congress have means of overriding the TPA procedures in 
addition to those provided by TPA statutes? 
As the TPA statutes acknowledge, the expedited procedures for which they provide operate as 
procedural rules of each house, and therefore each house retains full authority, under the 
Constitution, to change or override them at any point. Under this authority, either house could 
choose not to consider an implementing bill under the expedited procedure, but instead under its 
general rules, which might, among other things, permit amendments.30  
In practice, the House has usually considered implementing bills not under the statutory expedited 
procedure, but pursuant to special rules, reported from the Committee on Rules. These special 
rules have normally retained the statutory prohibition against amendment (thereby duplicating the 
conditions under which the House usually considers any revenue bill). However, the House could 
adopt a special rule permitting amendments to an implementation bill, and it has also adopted a 
resolution prohibiting consideration of an implementing bill for a specified trade agreement. 
The Senate normally considers implementing bills under the statutory expedited procedure, 
because supporters thereby avoid the possible need, in that chamber, to obtain a super-majority 
vote for cloture in order to limit debate. By unanimous consent, nevertheless, the Senate could 
                                                 
28 S. 995 and H.R. 1890, §6(b)(3). 
29 The bill specifies these periods in legislative days, but in the House these are normally equivalent to days of session.  
30 As noted earlier, if either house adopted amendments, a conference committee might be necessary to reach 
agreement on a version to send to the President. 
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agree to override any or all of the TPA procedures, including those that prohibit amendments to 
an implementing bill. 
Can Congress disapprove the President’s launching trade 
negotiations with a trading partner? 
Congress does not have the constitutional authority to prevent the President from entering into 
negotiations with a foreign government. Under the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, however, a bill to implement a trade agreement could 
have been denied expedited consideration if, within a 60-day period after the President notified 
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee of his intention to 
begin negotiations, either committee voted to disapprove the negotiation. This provision was not 
included in the 2002 statute and is not found in the proposed TPA-2015. 
Does TPA constrain Congress’s exercise of its constitutional 
authority on trade policy? 
Even though the TPA procedures are designed to ensure that Congress will act on implementing 
bills, and will do so without amending them, TPA legislation affords Congress several procedural 
means to maintain arguably tight reins on the executive branch’s exercise of the delegated trade 
authority. In the provisions of successive TPA statutes, Congress has developed the various 
mechanisms just discussed for preserving its authority in relation to the content of implementing 
bills, even when those bills are eligible for consideration under the expedited procedure. In 
practice, these mechanisms enable the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate 
Committee on Finance (the “revenue committees”) to operate as agents of Congress as a whole in 
protecting congressional prerogatives. 
TPA statutes include extensive, specific negotiating objectives to be pursued in covered trade 
agreements (see above). They also include extensive requirements for Congress to be notified of 
any trade agreement negotiations and consulted during their course. These requirements enable 
the revenue committees to monitor the negotiations actively and work to ensure that any trade 
agreements reached will be acceptable (see other sections above). 
The procedural mechanisms discussed in the preceding paragraphs, including the extension 
disapproval resolution, the procedural disapproval resolution, and the mock markup, enable 
Congress, and the two revenue committees in particular, to exercise a degree of control over the 
content and consideration of covered trade agreements that is comparable, in many respects, to 
that which these panels generally exercise over other legislation within their jurisdiction. 
Inasmuch as an implementing bill (if considered under the statutory expedited procedure) 
normally cannot be amended, however, the revenue committees exercise control in these cases 
instead through actions to shape the content of the implementing bill before it is introduced.  
In addition to these TPA-specific procedures, finally, each house retains the ability to consider 
implementing bills under its general rules rather than under the expedited procedure. 
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National Sovereignty and Trade Agreements 
Can a trade agreement force the United States to change its laws? 
Neither the 2002 TPA authority nor previous TPA/fast track authorities contained provisions 
addressing the issue of national sovereignty. The proposed TPA-2015 states that no provision of 
any trade agreement entered into under the TPA inconsistent with any law of the United States, of 
any state, or any locality of the United States could have any effect. Nor could any provision of a 
trade agreement prevent the government of the United States, of any state, or any U.S. locality 
from amending its laws. This provision from the proposed TPA-2015 essentially provides that, for 
domestic purposes, any trade agreement adopted under the TPA authority is not self-executing. 
Therefore, any potential agreement adopted through the TPA procedures would not displace any 
federal, state, or local law without further action being taken by the appropriate legislature.  
Would legislation implementing the terms of a trade agreement 
submitted under the TPA supersede existing law?  
If the implementing legislation amends or changes U.S. law, then it would supersede existing 
U.S. law. However, under previous grants of TPA, changes to U.S. law made by an implementing 
bill are to be “necessary or appropriate” to implement the commitments under the trade 
agreement. TPA-2015 changes this provision to “strictly necessary or appropriate.”  
What happens if a U.S. law violates a U.S. trade agreement? 
In general, if the United States does adopt an agreement with foreign countries, it would be bound 
by international law under the agreement. If a federal, state, or local law is found to be in 
violation of the free trade agreement, then the United States could be subject to removal of some 
benefits under the agreement, such as an increase in tariffs on its products, through a potential 
dispute resolution with a challenging country. The federal, state, or local government potentially 
would have to amend the law that is inconsistent with the trade agreement in order for the United 
States to avoid removal of benefits under the international agreement, but is not required to do so. 
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